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Abstract
We consider the problem of computing ratings using the results of
games played between a set of n players, and show how this problem can
be reduced to computing the positive eigenvectors corresponding to the
dominant eigenvalues of certain n×n matrices. There is a close connection
with the stationary probability distributions of certain Markov chains. In
practice, if n is large, then the matrices involved will be sparse, and the
power method may be used to solve the eigenvalue problems efficiently.
We give an algorithm based on the power method, and also derive the
same algorithm by an independent method.
1 Introduction
Suppose that n players, numbered 1, . . . , n, play a total of m games which may
end in a win, loss or draw. We assume that a win scores 1 point, a draw 0.5,
and a loss 0. The results can be summarised by an n×n score matrix S = (si,j),
where si,j is the number of points that player i scores against player j (i 6= j).
The diagonal entries si,i are arbitrary; for reasons discussed later we assume
that si,i = σ, where σ ≥ 0 is a constant. For the moment, the reader may
assume that σ = 0.
The aim is to assign ratings ri to the players in such a way that players who
perform better obtain higher ratings. The problem may arise when S represents
the results obtained in a single event, e.g. a Swiss tournament, and typically
we want to use the ratings to break ties between players on equal scores. It
may also arise when S represents all the recent results involving a large set of
players, for example in the regular updates to a national rating system. In the
latter case, we can expect the matrix S to be large and sparse.
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The expected score of one player when playing against another should depend
only on the difference of their ratings. Thus, we assume that, if the ratings are
correct, then the expected score of player i in a game against player j is f(ri−rj),
for some function f : R → [0, 1]. Since the total score obtained by both players
in a game is 1, the function f should satisfy the condition
f(z) + f(−z) = 1 . (1)
It is reasonable to assume that f(z) is monotonic increasing, and that
0 = lim
y→−∞
f(y) < f(z) < lim
y→+∞
f(y) = 1 . (2)
It is easy to find functions satisfying these conditions. For example, if φ(x)
is a probability density on (−∞,+∞), satisfying the condition φ(x) > 0 and
φ(x) = φ(−x), then
f(z) =
∫ z
−∞
φ(x) dx
satisfies (1) and (2). We could take the normal probability density
φ(x) =
1√
2pi
exp(−x2/2) ,
but there seems to be no real justification for this choice, and we shall make a
more convenient choice below.
Let g(z) = f(z)/(1−f(z)). For a game without draws, g(ri− rj) is the ratio
Prob(player i wins)/Prob(player j wins). From (1), g(z) = f(z)/f(−z) and
g(z)g(−z) = 1 . (3)
A simple solution to (3) is g(z) = ecz for some constant c. Since f(z) =
g(z)/(1 + g(z)), this suggests taking
f(z) =
1
1 + e−cz
. (4)
It is easy to check that f satisfies (1) and (2) if c > 0.
We shall assume that f(z) has the form (4). This involves an empirical
assumption that could be tested by experiment. For example, given three players
{1, 2, 3} and ratings r1, r2, r3 such that player 1 has expected score f(r1 − r2)
against player 2, and player 2 has expected score f(r2−r3) against player 3, is it
true that player 1 has expected score f(r1−r3) against player 3? The outcome of
an experiment to test this hypothesis might depend on the particular players and
what game they are playing. In practice our assumptions are computationally
convenient and we expect that they will be a reasonable approximation to the
truth.
There is some evidence [1] that the choice (4) of f(z) (corresponding to the
Logistic distribution) gives a better approximation to reality, at least for chess,
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than the choice based on the normal distribution, as originally proposed by
Elo [6]. Essentially, (4) is used in the current USCF rating system [7]. However,
in this paper our choice of (4) is made primarily for computational convenience,
and because it leads to an elegant algorithm.
By scaling the ratings, we can assume that c = 1. Thus, in the following we
assume that
f(z) =
1
1 + e−z
. (5)
To avoid the exponential function, it is convenient to define
xi = exp(ri) .
Thus, player i has expected score
1
1 + xj/xi
=
xi
xi + xj
in a game against player j.
The ratings ri are given by ri = lnxi, but we can add an arbitrary constant
β to all the ri, since only their differences are significant (this corresponds to
multiplying all the xi by a positive constant κ = exp(β)).
If i 6= j, the total number of games played between player i and player j is
gi,j = si,j + sj,i .
In the case i = j, we use this as a definition of gi,i, that is gi,i = 2si,i = 2σ.
Let W = (wi,j) be a symmetric matrix of positive weights wi,j . Games
between players i and j will be weighted in proportion to wi,j .
The actual weighted score of player i is
si =
n∑
j=1
si,jwi,j
and, given the players’ ratings, the expected weighted score is
ei =
n∑
j=1
(
xi
xi + xj
)
wi,jgi,j .
If the only information available on the players’ strengths is the results en-
coded in the matrix S, then it is reasonable to choose ratings such that the
expected and actual weighted scores of each player are the same, that is
ei = si for i = 1, . . . , n .
Using the definitions of ei, si and gi,j , this condition is
n∑
j=1
(
xi
xi + xj
)
wi,j(si,j + sj,i) =
n∑
j=1
si,jwi,j for i = 1, . . . , n . (6)
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2 Choosing Weights to Give a Linear Problem
The system of equations (6) is nonlinear in the unknowns xi, and it is not
immediately obvious that it has a solution, or how such a solution should be
found. It is obvious that a solution is not unique, because if x = (xi) is one
solution then so is κx for any positive constant κ.
In order to obtain a linear problem, we choose
wi,j = (xi + xj)ui,j (7)
for some symmetric positive matrix U .
With the choice (7) of weights, equation (6) reduces to
n∑
j=1
xiui,j(si,j + sj,i) =
n∑
j=1
si,j(xi + xj)ui,j .
Using the symmetry of U , this simplifies to
xi
n∑
j=1
aj,i =
n∑
j=1
ai,jxj , (8)
where ai,j = si,jui,j . The matrix A = (ai,j) is a weighted version of the score
matrix S, and has the same sparsity pattern as S.
Let
di =
n∑
j=1
aj,i .
di can be interpreted as the (weighted) numher of points lost by player i, that
is the (weighted) number of points scored by player i’s opponents in the games
they played against i.
If a player does not lose any points, then the data is insufficient to determine
a finite rating for him – he is “infinitely good”. Thus, we assume that di > 0
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Let D = diag(di) be the diagonal matrix with diagonal elements di. By our
assumption, D is nonsingular.
3 The Eigenvalue Problem
The condition (8) can be written in matrix-vector form as
Dx = Ax (9)
or
D−1Ax = x . (10)
Thus, the solution vector x is the eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue 1
of the matrix D−1A.
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We observe that the matrix A−D has linearly dependent rows; in fact, it is
easy to see from the definition of D that the rows of A−D sum to zero. Thus,
A − D is singular, so D−1A − I is singular, and D−1A does in fact have an
eigenvalue 1. Similarly for AD−1.
Equation (9) can be interpreted in terms of a Markov chain. Let y = Dx and
MT = AD−1. ThenM is the transition matrix of a Markov chain (mi,j ≥ 0 and∑
j mi,j = 1). The vector y/||y||1 gives the stationary probability distribution,
because yTM = yT , or equivalently AD−1y = y. It follows from standard
theory of Markov matrices that ρ(D−1A) = ρ(AD−1) ≤ 1.
In certain degenerate cases we can not expect finite ratings to be defined by
the data. We already assumed that di > 0. This is necessary, but not sufficient.
If the players can be split into two disjoint nonempty sets such that players in
the first set always beat the players in the second set, then the players in the
first set are “infinitely better” than the players in the second set. Similarly, if
players in the first set never play players in the second set, we can not expect
to compare their playing strengths. In practice, in either of these situations, we
could split the problem and rate players in each set separately.
In the typical nondegenerate case, D−1A has a simple eigenvalue λ1 = 1,
and the other eigenvalues λi are inside the unit circle, that is |λi| < 1 except
for λ1 = 1. Then the power method converges and we can find x by the simple
iteration
x(k+1) = D−1Ax(k) ,
with a suitable starting vector, e.g. x(0) = (1, 1, . . . , 1)T .
So far we did not mention the role of the constant σ (recall that si,i = σ). The
solution x of (10) is independent of σ, but the speed of convergence of the power
method depends on σ. We have found in our experiments that σ ∈ [0.2, 0.5] is a
good choice to maximise the speed of convergence. Any σ > 0 will ensure that
D is nonsingular.
4 Modifying the Weights
We have seen that solving an eigenvalue problem allows us to compute ratings if
the score matrix is weighted by the weight function (7). It would be more natural
to solve the problem with unit weights, that is wi,j = 1. Unit weights have the
advantage that, when applied to a round-robin (“all play all”) tournament,
players with the same score obtain the same ratings, as is easy to see from (6).
The condition wi,j = 1 is equivalent to
ui,j =
1
xi + xj
.
Thus, we can regard the solution of the eigenvalue problem (10) as an inner
iteration, and introduce an outer iteration where we change the weights. If x(k)
is the solution to the k-th eigenvalue problem (with x(0) = (1, 1, . . . , 1)T an
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initial vector), then the (k + 1)-st eigenvalue problem will use
u
(k+1)
i,j =
1
x
(k)
i + x
(k)
j
.
If the outer iteration converges, then it solves the original problem with weights
wi,j = (xi + xj)ui,j = 1 .
In practice, we have found that convergence is quite rapid in nondegenerate
cases. However, it is wasteful to solve the inner eigenvalue problems accurately.
It is much more efficient to perform just one iteration of the power method
in the inner loop. The resulting Algorithm 1 (without improvements to take
advantage of sparsity) is given below.
for i := 1..n do
x[i] := 1.0;
end for;
for k := 1, 2, ... until convergence do
for i := 1..n do
d[i] := 0.0;
end for;
for i := 1..n do
sum := 0.0;
for j := 1..n do
temp := s[i,j]/(x[i] + x[j]);
sum := sum + temp*x[j];
d[j] := d[j] + temp;
end for;
y[i] := sum;
end for;
for i := 1..n do
x[i] := y[i]/d[i];
end for;
end for;
Algorithm 1: Unit Weights
Since the aim is to compute ratings ri = lnxi, the convergence test should
ensure a small relative error in each component of x. Thus, an appropriate
stopping criterion is
max
1≤i≤n
∣∣∣∣∣x(k)i − x(k−1)ix(k)i
∣∣∣∣∣ < ε ,
where ε is a tolerance depending on the accuracy required.
Failure to converge in a reasonable number of iterations may indicate that
the problem is degenerate and that some ratings are diverging to ±∞. In this
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case one or more players should in principal be excluded from consideration. A
more convenient solution in practice is to add a “dummy” player who draws
with all the other players, and whose games are given a positive weight γ, for
example γ = 1. As γ → 0+ the ratings tend to the correct values (possibly ±∞),
but for any positive γ we obtain a nondegenerate problem and finite ratings1.
If n is large then S (and hence A) will be sparse, since there are at most
two off-diagonal entries for each game played. Thus, the number of nonzero
elements is at most 2m+ n. The inner loop of the algorithm above essentially
involves the multiplication of A on the right by x, and on the left by [1, 1, . . . , 1].
Thus, standard sparse matrix techniques can be used to reduce the complexity
of the inner iteration from O(n2) to O(m).
In practice the final ratings would be modified by a linear transformation to
make them positive and not too small, before rounding to the nearest integer.
(FIDE Elo ratings are usually in the range [0, 3000], and BCF ratings are usually
in the range [0, 300], see [9].)
5 An Independent Derivation of Algorithm 1
From (6) with wi,j = 1 we have, for i = 1, . . . , n,
n∑
j=1
(
xi
xi + xj
)
(si,j + sj,i) =
n∑
j=1
si,j . (11)
This simplifies to
n∑
j=1
xisj,i
xi + xj
=
n∑
j=1
xjsi,j
xi + xj
and, taking xi outside the sum on the left, we see that
xi =
 n∑
j=1
si,jxj
xi + xj
/ n∑
j=1
sj,i
xi + xj
 . (12)
A natural iteration to solve (12) is
x
(k+1)
i =
 n∑
j=1
si,jx
(k)
j
x
(k)
i + x
(k)
j
/ n∑
j=1
sj,i
x
(k)
i + x
(k)
j
 (13)
for k = 1, 2, . . .. However, it is easy to see that this is exactly the iteration
implemented in Algorithm 1!
The significance of the diagonal terms si,i = σ ≥ 0 is apparent if we consider
the diagonal terms (j = i) in the numerator and denominator of (13). The
1This solution is similar to the one adopted in the PageRank algorithm used by the Google
search engine [2, 10, 11], where a fictional page essentially has links to every other page. Our
parameter γ corresponds to the Page Rank algorithm’s 1− d.
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diagonal term in the numerator is σ/2 and the diagonal term in the denominator
is σ/(2x
(k)
i ). As σ → ∞ the right-hand side of (13) → x(k)i . Thus, σ acts as a
damping factor: larger values of σ tend to reduce the change x
(k)
i → x(k+1)i at
each iteration.
Other iterations can be obtained in a similar manner. For example, taking
xi outside the sum on the left side of (11), we obtain the iteration
x
(k+1)
i =
 n∑
j=1
si,j
/ n∑
j=1
si,j + sj,i
x
(k)
i + x
(k)
j
 . (14)
However, our numerical experiments suggest that (14) gives slower convergence
than (13). This conclusion is confirmed by a first-order analysis in the special
case that all the xi are approximately equal.
6 Incorporating Old Ratings
Often some or all of the players will already have ratings, say player i has rating
x̂i based on ŵi games
2. It is easy to take such “old” ratings into account by
a slight modification of the argument leading to equation (6). We add ŵi/2 to
the actual weighted score si, as if player i drew ŵi games against a player with
rating x̂i, and also add ŵixi/(xi + x̂i) to the expected weighted score ei. Thus
equation (6) becomes
n∑
j=1
(
xi
xi + xj
)
wi,j(si,j + sj,i) +
ŵixi
xi + x̂i
=
n∑
j=1
si,jwi,j +
ŵi
2
(15)
for i = 1, . . . , n, and equation (11) becomes
n∑
j=1
(
xi
xi + xj
)
(si,j + sj,i) =
n∑
j=1
si,j −
(
xi − x̂i
xi + x̂i
)
ŵi
2
. (16)
Now, it is easy to see that the iteration (13) becomes
x
(k+1)
i =
 n∑
j=1
si,jx
(k)
j
x
(k)
i + x
(k)
j
 + ŵix̂i
2(x
(k)
i + x̂i) n∑
j=1
sj,i
x
(k)
i + x
(k)
j
 + ŵi
2(x
(k)
i + x̂i)
(17)
for k = 1, 2, . . ..
2The weight ŵi associated with an old rating might be reduced by a constant factor, say
0.5, to give less weight to old games than to recent ones.
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7 Conclusion
We have shown how the computation of ratings for players of chess (and other
games) can be reduced to an eigenvalue problem, or a sequence of eigenvalue
problems, and that these eigenvalue problems are closely related to the problem
of computing the stationary probability distributions of certain Markov chains.
The eigenvalue problems can be solved efficiently by the power method. We
derived an algorithm (Algorithm 1) by two different methods; one derivation
(§§3–4) used the power method, the other (§5) was from first principles.
We have tested Algorithm 1 on small examples and on some larger examples
with simulated scores. It would be interesting to test the algorithm on real data
and to see how it compares with the methods currently in use for chess [9, 1, 6, 7]
and other games, e.g. football [4]. Because they are practical systems that have
evolved over time, most of these methods involve various ad hoc features and
piecewise linear approximations, so they are less elegant (though perhaps more
practical) than the relatively simple algorithm discussed here.
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